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How to Move Beyond the Exclusionary
Rule: Structuring Judicial Response to
Legislative Reform Efforts
Harold J. Krent*
The exclusionary rule remains one of the most controversial judicial doctrines
of this era. When judges order dangerous criminals released based on seeming
technicalities, the public's faith in the judiciary erodes. Moreover, police
misconduct may be deterred in a variety of ways, one hopes, without exacting the
heavy price of excluding highly probative evidence. And, from a compensation
perspective, the exclusionary rule is perverse. Innocent victims of unreasonable
searches and seizures generally recover nothing, while those committing the most
heinous crimes recover the most-their liberty. At a minimum, sophisticated
proposals such as the one presented in the Pepperdine Study' should afford all of
us-whether judges, legislators, or academics-the occasion to reflect on whether the
exclusionary rule should be maintained.2
Whatever its strengths and weaknesses-and there are both'-the Pepperdine
* Professor and Associate Dean, Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1. See L. Timothy Perrin et al., If It's Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the Exclusionary Rule, 83
IOWA L. REV 669 (1998).
2. The proposal for an alternative mechanism to deter unconstitutional searches and seizures is
certainly not unique. For a sampling of other suggested alternatives to the exclusionary rule, see
MALCOLM R. WILKEY, ENFORCING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT BY ALTERNATIVES TO THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE (1982); Akhil Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV.
757 (1994) (stressing tort option); Harvey R. Levin, An Alternative to the Exclusionary Rulefor Fourth
Amendment Violations, 58 JUDICATURE 75 (1974) (setting forth the alternative called the Joint Liability
Plan). Congress for its part often has debated efforts to limit the exclusionary rule.
3. For instance, the proposal excels in bringing to bear relevant empirical studies on the
administration of the exclusionary rule. See Perrin et al., supra note 1, at 678-735. It does not,
however, sufficiently grapple with the complex and perplexing problem of issue and fact preclusion.
The relationship among administrative adjudication, § 1983 suits, criminal trials, and habeas corpus
suits needs to be fleshed out. Moreover, the article does not sufficiently address the costs of the
administrative scheme; if nothing else, the exclusionary rule is administratively efficient in avoiding
the need for a separate judicial proceeding, and thereby minimizes attorney's fees and court costs.
Study is strangely silent with respect to the question of implementation. Given the
United States Supreme Court's precedent in Mapp v. Ohio,4 how can the proposal
be enacted? Why would not the Mapp precedent invalidate any legislative effort
of the sort advocated? Indeed, some have argued that Mapp does not permit any
legislative experimentation.5 Even if Mapp does not foreclose the legislature's
option to implement different approaches, why would the United States Supreme
Court permit California to adopt an administrative alternative to the exclusionary
rule while mandating that the exclusionary rule be followed in the other states?
Does the Constitution tolerate such nonuniformity?
This Article addresses that gap in the Pepperdine Study by arguing that state
and federal legislatures have the power to enact the proposed administrative
scheme and that the courts may-and perhaps should-uphold any such effort. First,
this Article argues, as have others, 6 that the exclusionary rule as a judge-made rule
can be superseded by congressional action.7 Properly understood, there is no
inconsistency between Mapp and the administrative proposal in the Pepperdine
Study. Although Mapp has constitutional roots, the Court has over-enforced the
Fourth Amendment norm, permitting other institutional actors to participate in
determining the best way to enforce the constitutional norm protecting against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Mapp does not hold that the exclusionary rule
is constitutionally enshrined; rather, other institutional actors may devise alternative
schemes which obviate the need for the exclusionary rule.
Second, this Article suggests that the United States Supreme Court, despite its
lack of exclusive jurisdiction to consider remedial options for the exclusionary rule,
properly retains control over legislative reform efforts through its power to review
the introduction of illegally obtained evidence in particular cases and
controversies.8 The Court should review the adequacy of any alternative remedial
scheme based on all available evidence. This Article further argues that the Court
should afford substantial deference to Congress's determination of how best to
enforce the Fourth Amendment. As with other constitutional common law
remedies, Congress can create alternative means of enforcing constitutional values
4. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
5. Presumably, only a decision based on the Constitution-as opposed to grounded in common
law-can bind the states, and states therefore might be powerless to alter the constitutional decision. See
JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAw 173-98 (1993) (discussing, in detail, the
ramifications of the Miranda decisions); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial
Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 1999) (arguing that the gap between remedy and right
is grossly overemphasized and thus suggesting implicitly that all Supreme Court judgments, whether
based on constitutional right or remedy, are binding on others); cf. Henry Monaghan, Foreword:
Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARv. L. REV. I, 8-10 (1975) (questioning the Supreme Court's
legitimacy in mandating that states adhere to the Supreme Court's formulation ofdiscretionary remedies
in constitutional cases).
6. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190
(1988); Monaghan, supra note 5, at 8-10.
7. See infra Part 1.
8. See infra Part H.
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based on its presumably greater institutional competence for factfinding. The
Court's analysis of when to allow congressional remedies to displace the judicially
created remedy under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents9 poses the closest
analogy, suggesting the Court's willingness to defer to majoritarian determination
of appropriate remedies."0 Furthermore, the Court should defer even more to the
legislative product if it is backed by detailed findings substantiating the benefits
expected from the substitute remedy.
Finally, this Article argues that state courts and lower federal courts have
independent authority to review the adequacy of legislative alternatives. " Change
in the exclusionary rule can be implemented prior to any Supreme Court
imprimatur. Indeed, my argument is hardly radical in light of the fact that lower
federal courts currently make a similar inquiry in Bivens cases. The implication for
state courts, however, is admittedly more controversial. If state courts may permit
legislative alternatives to the exclusionary rule in their own courts, uniformity
under our constitutional system would be lost. Although perhaps disconcerting,
that result is a product of our federalist system and even today states provide
differing protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. Thus, I conclude
that the Supreme Court should respect the right of states, based on their own
institutional concerns and priorities, to forge different approaches to protect against
violation of the Fourth Amendment.
I.
We conventionally understand the Supreme Court's constitutional decisions to
be final in the sense that the Court's interpretations will govern in all subsequent
cases. Lower federal and state courts must heed the Supreme Court's commands.
To be sure, Congress does not need to abide by the Court's interpretations when
passing laws; nor need the President follow the interpretation in issuing a pardon. 2
But, until the Justices change their minds, 3 the Court's prior constitutional
9. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
10. See id.at 397.
11. See infra Part Il
12. See Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REV. 707,
747 (1985) ("Members of Congress have both the authority and the capability to participate
constructively in constitutional interpretation."); Michael S. Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch:
Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEo. L. J. 217 (1994) (addressing the Executive's
independent obligation to interpret the Constitution).
13. Justices remain free to reverse their prior constitutional rulings, and instances of such reversals
are not uncommon. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)
(reversing National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990) (reversing in part Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
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interpretations will govern in all cases and controversies, whether brought in state
or federal court.
However, when the Court formulates constitutional law in a common-law
capacity, other actors may play a more direct role in constitutional lawmaking. For
instance, consider the Supreme Court's resolution of cases brought under the
Dormant Commerce Clause. In Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.4 the
Court invalidated an Iowa statute prohibiting the use of certain large trucks within
the state under the Commerce Clause for unduly burdening interstate commerce.'5
The Court reasoned that Iowa's motive in banning the trucks was protectionist and
did not yield appreciable safety benefits to Iowa's citizens. 6 But, Congress is not
bound by the Court's judgments under the Commerce Clause and can permit state
restrictions, such as Iowa's ban, that the Court has invalidated. 7 The Court's
constitutional decisions do not necessarily set the boundaries of the right in
question.
Moreover, the Court has explicitly upheld constitutional remedies that extend
beyond the actual constitutional violation. 8 Such extensive remedies may be
needed to prevent future violations of the constitutional right, but are not
themselves required by the Constitution. In a different institutional climate, the
remedies may no longer be needed.
For instance, in Hutto v. Finney9 the Court considered the propriety of an
injunction that, in part, protected Arkansas inmates from being placed in isolation
beyond thirty days. In upholding the injunction, the Court did not reason that
placement in isolation on the thirty-first day violated the Eighth Amendment's ban
against Cruel and Unusual punishments. Rather, the Court justified the injunction
on the ground that the bright-line rule represented "a mechanical-and therefore an
easily enforced-method of minimizing overcrowding."2 Given the difficulty of
determining just when conditions violated the Eighth Amendment and the Court's
understandable mistrust of the Arkansas prison system,2 the Court imposed a
prophylactic remedy to help protect against future violations.22
14. 450U.S.662(1981).
15. See id. at 671; see also Stephen C. Kohl, Constitutional Law-Kassel v. Consolidated
Freightways Corp.: 'Goodbuddy' Raymond Revisited in Name Only, 8 J. CORP. L. 543 (1983).
16. See Kassel, 450 U.S. at 671-75; see also Monaghan, supra note 5, at 16-18 (arguing that
dormant commerce clause cases should be viewed as a species of common law).
17. Congress partially overruled Kassel in amendments to The Surface Transportation Assistance
Act of 1982, which permitted states in some circumstances to bar the large trucks from interstate
highways. See Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, § 411, 49 U.S.C. § 31111 (1997).
18. See Kohl, supra note 15, at 563-64.
19. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
20. Seeid.at688n.ll.
21. The Court pointedly related the grisly conditions in the Arkansas facilities which included
stabbing, rapes, and primitive barracks conditions. See id. at 681 n.3.
22. See id. at 688; see also Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 281 (1977) (holding that
constitutional remedies can extend beyond remedying the narrow condition that violated the
Constitution).
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Judges may protect against conduct threatening constitutional violations by
formulating broad constitutional rules as well as by fashioning extensive remedies.
The motivations are similar. Courts may lack the resources to police
unconstitutional conduct in any other way. Over-enforcement of a constitutional
right avoids line-drawing in contexts in which courts cannot rely upon other
governmental actors to protect the constitutional right asserted. In the case of the
exclusionary rule, therefore, the critical inquiry is whether the Court over-enforced
the Fourth Amendment norm in choosing that remedy or rather held that exclusion
was required by the Constitution itself.2 3 The line between the two forms of
constitutional lawmaking is not always clear.24
Historical evolution of the exclusionary rule suggests that, despite some
ambivalence, the judiciary has viewed the exclusionary rule as a court-created
remedy as opposed to a constitutionally mandated rule. In Weeks v. United States 5
the Supreme Court held that use of evidence that had been unconstitutionally seized
in federal trials resulted in "a denial of the constitutional rights of the accused.
2 6
Accordingly, the Court crafted a rule of exclusion: all evidence collected by
federal law enforcement officials in violation of suspects' rights could not be used
at trial. The Court's characterization of the decision in subsequent cases was not
consistent, and exceptions existed. The Court described the exclusionary rule as
a question of evidence27 as well as a constitutional command.28 The precise
23. Alternatively, the Court may have acted in a lawless manner by imposing its own policy
preference upon the states. See GRANO, supra note 5, at 185-95. Because prophylactic constitutional
rules seem so prevalent, however, that view calls into question not only Mapp but also Miranda, the
overbreadth doctrine, constitutional remedies, and arguably much more. The Court's ability to over-
enforce a constitutional right seems well entrenched. Moreover, as Ihave argued elsewhere, the Court's
over-enforcement tack is normatively appealing, stemming from the judiciary's own institutional
limitations. See Harold J. Krent, The Supreme Court as an Enforcement Agency, 55 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1149, 1171-76 (1998).
24. For an argument that consideration of remedies cannot be separated from that of rights, see
Levinson, supra note 5.
25. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
26. See id. at 398. The roots of the exclusionary rule lie in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886), which addressed a mixture of Fourth and Fifth Amendment concerns.
27. In Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961),
for example, the Court declined to impose the exclusionary remedy on trials in the state court system,
even while holding that the Fourth Amendment right was fully applicable. The Court declined to
impose the exclusionary rule in part because of the deference owed to state courts in fashioning
evidentiary rules within their own jurisdictions and in part because "other means of protection" shielded
the right to privacy making application of the exclusionary rule unnecessary. See id. at 30. In
concurrence, Justice Black explicitly termed the exclusionary rule "a judicially created rule of evidence
which Congress might negate." See id. at 39-40 (Black, J., concurring).
28. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S.
28 (1927).
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moorings of Weeks long remained in question.
Even when imposing the exclusionary rule on the states in Mapp, the Court's
plurality opinion equivocated as to the nature of the exclusionary rule. The Court
asserted that its decision "gives to the individual no more than that which the
Constitution guarantees him,"29 suggesting a constitutional basis. But the Court
also described the rule as a "judicially implied . . . deterrent safeguard."30 In
concurrence, Justice Black found a constitutional basis to exist "when the Fourth
Amendment's ban against unreasonable searches and seizures is considered
together with the Fifth Amendment's ban against compelled self-incrimination."31
And Justice Douglas, also in concurrence, stated that imposing the rule upon the
states was necessary to ensure that the Fourth Amendment would not become a
"dead letter,"32 even though he acknowledged the theoretical availability of other
remedies to enforce the Fourth Amendment. 33  Justice Harlan, in dissent,
understood the plurality's argument to rest on the Constitution, as the Court's
decision had in Weeks: "the rule... excluding in federal criminal trials the use of
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, derives not from the
'supervisory power' of this Court over the federal judicial system, but from
Constitutional requirement. '34 To Justice Harlan, that conclusion was nonsense
because the exclusionary rule had no constitutional basis and rested merely on the
Justices' contestable policy judgments.35
Justice Harlan's view gained partial ascendancy in cases such as United States
v. Calandra36 and Stone v. Powell.37 In Calandra the Court permitted the use of
illegally seized evidence in grand jury proceedings,3" and in Stone the Court held
that Fourth Amendment claims based upon the introduction of evidence illegally
obtained were not cognizable on habeas. 39 In both decisions, the Court predicated
its holdings on the fact that "[t]he exclusionary rule was ajudicially created means
of effectuating the rights secured by the Fourth Amendment."'  After these
decisions, the Court's view has been unwavering; the exclusionary rule is a
29. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660.
30. See id. at 648.
31. See id. at 662 (Black, J., concurring).
32. See id. at 670 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. at 47 (Rutledge,
J., dissenting)).
33. See id. (Douglas, J., concurring).
34. See id. at 678 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
35. See id. at 678-79 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
36. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
37. 428 U.S. 465 (1976); see also Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963) ("[Tlhe demands of
our federal system compel us to distinguish between evidence held inadmissible because of our
supervisory powers over federal courts and that held inadmissible because prohibited by the United
States Constitution .... ").
38. See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354-55,
39. See Stone, 428 U.S. at 494.
40. See id., 428 U.S. at 482; see also Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348 ("[The rule is a judicially created
remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect .... ).
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judicially imposed policy, not a constitutional obligation. Consequently, the Court
thereafter has balanced the rule's deterrence value against the benefits to be gained
in each relevant context.
4
'
For instance, consider the Supreme Court's recent decision in Pennsylvania
Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott.42 There, a parolee argued that evidence
allegedly obtained illegally from his residence by a parole officer should be
excluded in subsequent parole-revocation proceedings. 43 At the outset the Court
stressed "that the State's use of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment does not itself violate the Constitution." 4 As "a judicially created
means of deterring illegal searches and seizures," the exclusionary rule applies
"only where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs."'45 The
Court concluded that, in the parole context, the exclusionary rule "would provide
only minimal deterrence benefits" yet "would both hinder the functioning of state
parole systems and alter the traditionally flexible, administrative nature of parole
revocation proceedings."'
Under contemporary doctrine, therefore, the exclusionary rule-though derived
from the Constitution-must be considered a judge-made rule. In an appropriate
case, the Supreme Court may abandon or continue to modify the rule based not
only on a change of heart but on changes in the legal landscape that minimize the
need for the rule.
Understanding Mapp to rest on an over-enforced constitutional norm has direct
consequences principally for the legislative branch. At the time of Mapp, the Court
explicitly found existing methods of enforcing the Fourth Amendment
inadequate.47 ButMapp signals that, if alternative safeguards are created, the Court
will reconsider the exclusionary rule. The Court has invited other institutional
actors to participate in shaping the ultimate contours of the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures.
41. For an analysis of evolution of the Court's deterrence rationale, see Jerry E. Norton, The
Exclusionary Rule Reconsidered: Restoring the Status Quo Ante, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 261,263-
70(1998).
42. 118 S. Ct. 2014 (1998).
43. See id. at 2018.
44. See id. at 2019.
45. See id. (citation omitted).
46. See id. at 2020; see also INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (holding exclusionary
rule inapplicable in civil deportation proceeding); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (holding
rule inapplicable to civil tax proceeding).
47. See supra text accompanying notes 29-35.
The Court's authority to revisit the exclusionary rule does not suggest its
willingness to do so. Indeed, the prospect for judicial change may seem dim. The
Supreme Court has retained the core of the rule for over thirty-five years, despite
a barrage of protests. The Court may be willing to chip away at the rule without
extirpating it.
Moreover, administration of the exclusionary rule may itself stymie legislative
creativity, given that legislatively spurred reform ultimately may be blocked by the
Supreme Court. Legislators cannot gauge the benchmarks that the Supreme Court
will use in deciding whether to accept their reforms. The Court in Mapp expressed
skepticism about the prospect for legislative reform, noting that "other remedies
have been worthless and futile."' And Chief Justice Burger lamented in Stone v.
Powell that "even if legislatures were inclined to experiment with alternative
remedies, they have no assurance that the judicially created rule will be abolished
or even modified in response to such legislative innovations."'49
Be that as it may, the prospect for Supreme Court change is significant. First,
in the last twenty years, the Court has cut back on the rule considerably and
individual Justices have condemned it roundly. 0 The Court has overturned other
Warren Court precedents, particularly in the habeas context.51
Second, the Pepperdine Study or any similar alternative-if adopted-may well
prod the Supreme Court to reassess the continuing need for the exclusionary rule.52
A state or lower court decision upholding the remedial alternative would force the
Supreme Court's hand.53 The Court may be more willing to jettison the rule if it
can rely on legislative alternatives. Since Mapp, the Court has not considered the
adequacy of any legislative alternatives to the exclusionary rule. The Court would
need to ascertain whether the legislative alternative provides adequate safeguards
to ensure continued deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.
The Bivens context presents the closest analogy. For the first time in Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 4 the Supreme Court recognized a cause of action
48. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652 (1961); see also Paul G. Cassell and Bret S. Hayman,
Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV.
839, 922 (1996) (making similar point in context of Miranda warnings).
49. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 501 (1976).
50. See supra text accompanying notes 23-44.
51. See Stone, 428 U.S. at 480-81; see also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (limiting
harmless error doctrine of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), on collateral review); Teague
v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (limiting retroactive scope of habeas embraced in cases such as Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (foreclosing review of
defaulted claims that could have been litigated under Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963)).
52. See Perrin et al., supra note 1, at 743-54.
53. See also infra note 118.
54. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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directly under the Constitution for money damages against federal officials."
Bivens arose from an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment." Without a warrant, Federal Bureau of Narcotics agents arrested
Bivens for alleged narcotics violations." The agents humiliated him in front of his
family and proceeded to ransack his apartment in an unsuccessful search for
drugs.58 Furthermore, the agents threatened to arrest his entire family.59 Bivens
subsequently filed an in forma pauperis suit seeking relief for the alleged
unconstitutional search and seizure.'
To redress the Fourth Amendment violation, the Court fashioned a monetary
remedy." As with the adoption of the exclusionary rule in Weeks and later in
Mapp, the Court did not make it entirely clear whether the Bivens remedy stemmed
directly from the Constitution or from the common-law powers of the Court.
In permitting the suit to proceed, the Court cautioned in general that recovery
could only be gained where 1) the petitioner has no alternative means of obtaining
redress, and 2) there are no "special factors counseling hesitation."62 Bivens further
suggested that if there is "an explicit congressional declaration that... [plaintiff
should be] remitted to another remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress, '63
then no Bivens suit would lie. Like the exclusionary rule, the Bivens remedy is not
constitutionally compelled per se as long as some way to redress constitutional
violations exists. The Court apparently invited Congress to join in a dialogue to
determine the most efficacious way to remedy constitutional violations.
In Bivens the Court considered common-law remedies available for
unreasonable searches and seizures such as trespass, false arrest, and assault." The
Court concluded that such remedies were too uncertain and incomplete, particularly
given immunity doctrines, to provide adequate safeguards. 6 Thus, although the
Court created a cause of action, it plainly directed future courts to consider whether
sufficient alternative remedies existed to obviate the necessity for the newly created
cause of action. Therefore, Bivens provides an apt context for gauging the
Supreme Court's probable reaction to a legislative effort to create substitute
remedies for the exclusionary rule.
55. See id. at 397.




60. See id. at 389-90.
61. See id. at 395-96.
62. See id. at 396-97.
63. See id. at 397.
64. See id. at 390-95.
65. See id. at 394-95.
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In the immediate wake of Bivens, the Supreme Court demanded that the
legislatively crafted remedy provide similar recovery to that obtainable in a Bivens
suit. For instance, in Carlson v. Green' the Court considered whether an inmate
could sue prison officials directly under the Eighth Amendment for the failure to
afford appropriate medical care.6 The Court recognized that a legislative avenue
of recovery existed under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)6 but found that
alternative deficient.69 With respect to deterrence, the Court determined that an
action against an individual defendant likely served as a more effective deterrent
than an action against the United States as under the FTCA.7 ° As a related matter,
the inability of plaintiffs to recover punitive damages under the FTCA undermined
the prospect of effective deterrence under the FTCA.71 With respect to
compensation, the Court noted that no jury trial is available under that Act, limiting
the plaintiff's ability to obtain compensation in certain types of cases.72 Seemingly,
the Court required any legislative alternative to grant protection comparable to the
Court-crafted remedy.73
Following Bivens the Court in Bush v. Lucas74 considered whether an
aerospace engineer employed by the federal government could sue under the First
Amendment for a retaliatory demotion. 75 Assuming that a constitutional violation
had occurred, the Court nonetheless held that, in light of the elaborate remedial
system established by Congress for federal personnel, the Court would decline to
recognize a Bivens action in that context.76 Even though the congressional remedy
was not an equally effective substitute for the judicial remedy sought, the Court
concluded that it was constitutionally adequate given Congress's creation of an
elaborate system to handle federal personnel matters.77 Bush fused the two initial
inquiries from Bivens: whether a special factor counselling hesitation existed and
whether Congress had created an alternative remedial scheme.7" In essence, the
Court stated that it would find a special factor counselling hesitation if Congress
had crafted a comprehensive remedial scheme, 79 even if the remedy provided was
not as effective as maintaining a Bivens claim. 0
66. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
67. See id. at 16.
68. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1998).
69. See Carlson, 446 U.S. at 19-20.
70. See id. at 20-21.
71. Seeid. at22.
72. See id. at 22-23.
73. See id. at 18-19.
74. 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
75. See id. at 369.
76. See id. at 389-90.
77. See id. at 374.
78. See id. at 389-90.
79. See id. at 388-89.
80. See Gene R. Nichol, Bivens, Chilicky, and Constitutional Damages Claims, 75 VA. L. REV.
1117, 1144-45 (1989).
864
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The Court manifested even greater deference to legislative will in Schweiker
v. Chilicky.8 ' Plaintiffs in that case received Social Security benefits and claimed
that government officials violated their due process rights by arbitrarily cutting off
their benefits. 2 In recognition of abuses in the social security system, Congress
had adopted a more comprehensive administrative review system to minimize the
continued potential for abuse. 3 Back benefits were available. 4 However, no
collateral damages could be obtained for losses resulting from the initial wrongful
denial of benefits, such as a house foreclosure or furniture repossession during the
period in which benefits were wrongfully withheld.85 Nonetheless, the Court
declined to recognize a due process claim against the program administrators:
"[w]hen the design of a Government program suggests that Congress had provided
what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations that
may occur in the course of its administration, we have not created additional Bivens
remedies." 6
Two recent courts of appeals decisions addressing the adequacy of legislative
alternatives further suggest the likely judicial response to the Pepperdine Study, 7
if adopted. First, in Moore v. Glickman8 a former employee of the Agricultural
Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS) sued several agency officials for
alleged unconstitutional conduct arising out of an internal agency investigation of
the agency office where she had worked.89 She asserted that the defendants'
conduct failed to afford her due process, and that the investigation was launched
for retaliatory purposes because she had criticized the performance of an influential
state official with whom the agency worked.'
In holding the Bivens claim precluded, the Ninth Circuit first stated that
"where Congress has provided some mechanism for relief that it considers
adequate to remedy constitutional violations, Bivens claims are precluded."'"
Although the court recognized that employees in Moore's position were not covered
by any comprehensive civil service protections, as in Bush v. Lucas, the court
81. 487 U.S. 412 (1988) (declining to recognize cause of action in light of the Social Security Act's
elaborate administrative remedy scheme even though Congress decided to provide no remedy in the
situation presented).
82. See id. at 418.
83. See id. at 416.
84. See id. at 417.
85. Seeid. at419.
86. See id. at 423.
87. See Perrin et al., supra note 1, at 673-74.
88. 113 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 1997).
89. See id. at 989.
90. See id. at 990.
91. See id. at 991.
reasoned that she could rely on the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 9, to
guarantee judicial review of her employment termination. 3 No damages would
necessarily be available, but the validity of the termination could be assessed.94
The court concluded that "[a] finding of preclusion is premised only on an
alternative scheme and some indication that Congress deliberately elected not to
include complete relief."'95 The standard of review was entirely deferential.9
6
Contrast Moore with the Seventh Circuit's decision in Bagola v. Kindt.9
There, an inmate sued prison officials under the Eighth Amendment for injuries he
received while working for the Federal Prison Industries." Bagola's hand was
severed when he caught his arm in an exposed part of a machine that he was
inspecting at the prison facility.9 He alleged that prison officials were deliberately
indifferent to his safety in failing to install minimally acceptable safety devices on
the machine."°°
Before turning to the merits of the Bivens claim, the Seventh Circuit
considered whether the claim was precluded in light of Congress's creation of an
alternative remedial scheme under 18 U.S.C. § 4126, which provides a worker's
compensation-type remedy for prison workers.' 0 ' Inmates can apply both for lost
wages and for compensation for any injuries received."°
According to the court of appeals, "[tihe key inquiry is whether Congress
intended to redress constitutional violations with a remedy other than damages-by
providing a remedial scheme with procedural safeguards sufficient to protect
individual's constitutional rights."' °3 The court recognized that the remedies
provided by Congress do not have to be comprehensive or as effective as a Bivens
claim.'" But the court held that there is a critical difference distinguishing Bagola
from cases such as Chilicky and Bush v. Lucas. 5 In those cases "the alternative
remedial system . . . provided a significant opportunity to expose allegedly
unconstitutional conduct"l°6-the administrative process in Chilicky and the civil
92. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1996).
93. See Moore, 113 F.3d at 992-93.
94. See id. at 993. In addition, the court believed that Congress's failure to extend coverage of the
civil service laws to such employees was not inadvertent. See id.
95. Id. at 994.
96. See also Lee v. Hughes, 145 F.3d 1272 (11 th Cir. 1998) (holding that a federal employee, also
not covered by civil service reform act, was precluded from bringing Bivens claim). But see Krueger
v. Lyng, 927 F.2d 1050 (8th Cir. 1991) (implying Bivens remedy in light of the fact that no
comprehensive scheme covered federal employee relationship).
97. 131 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 1997).
98. See id. at 634.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 633-34, 636.
101. See id. at 636.
102. See id. at 642.
103. Id. at 641.
104. See id. at 642.
105. See id. at 642-43.
106. Id. at 643.
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service scheme in Bush v. Lucas. 7 Although full damages may not have been
available, the offending unconstitutional conduct could have been unearthed and
sanctioned."° In contrast, given the no-fault system of the worker's compensation
scheme, unconstitutional conduct would rarely come to light. 9 Under the
congressional scheme, the critical factor is injury, not how the injury is caused."'
Moreover, claims for injuries cannot be made until forty-five days prior to release,
which would possibly delay any adjudication for years. Therefore, the court
reasoned that "[i]f an administrative scheme that did not safeguard a claimant's
constitutional rights precluded a Bivens claim, unconstitutional conduct would be
insulated from review by any adjudicatory forum."'.. The court concluded that
"courts should not readily assume that a Bivens claim is precluded" if "the
procedural safeguards of an administrative scheme are inadequate protectors of
constitutional rights.""'
Despite the result, the court in Bagola manifested considerable deference to
legislative judgment. The court demurred only due to the extraordinary limitations
inherent in any worker's compensation scheme. Taken together with Moore, courts
will permit legislative alternatives to supersede the Bivens remedy as long as the
remedial system is comprehensive and affords some opportunity to root out
unconstitutional conduct.
Thus, the Bivens analogy suggests that the Court might not require any
legislative alternative to the exclusionary rule to provide as full deterrence or as
comprehensive relief. Rather, the Court might defer if convinced that the
legislative design constitutes a comprehensive effort, even if falling somewhat
short, to provide adequate deterrence of and relief from constitutional wrongs. No
empirical support is necessary. Under that framework, the administrative scheme
advocated in the Pepperdine Study would likely fare well." 3
To be sure, in Bivens the question is what rights to afford individuals
challenging governmental action, while in the exclusionary rule context the
question is what rights to afford individuals subjected to unconstitutional conduct.
Perhaps Congress merits more deference when determining how the Constitution
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 644.
110. See id.
Ill. Id. at 644.
112. Id. On the merits of the Eighth Amendment claims, the court decided against the inmate. See
id. at 645-48.
113. See Perrin et al., supra note 1, at 743-55. The proposal ensures that unconstitutional conduct
will be aired. It predicates recovery in the administrative process on a demonstration of
unconstitutionality and preserves the exclusionary rule as an option in the case of intentional
wrongdoing. See id.
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is to be used as a sword instead of as a shield. More deference might be accorded
the legislative product when safeguarding the government from intrusive suits as
opposed to when the government itself brings the machinery of government to bear
upon an individual.
I am not convinced. The same constitutional right is implicated whether the
basis is a damages claim as inBivens or a motion to suppress. The Court in the two
situations has fashioned procedural rules-Bivens claims and the exclusionary
rule-to help enforce the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
The question of whether Congress has greater capacity than the courts-due to
institutional competence or majoritarian legitimacy-to effectuate Fourth
Amendment rights should be the same in both contexts, and the deference owed to
Congress should likely be comparable.
In any event, at a minimum the Court will likely defer to carefully crafted
legislative findings as to why the alternative remedial scheme was adopted.
Explicit legislative documentation of the reasons for alternatives to the
exclusionary rule may well help convince the Court that the exclusionary rule
should be abandoned.
The Commerce Clause cases pose a helpful analogy. In United States v.
Lopez" 4 the Supreme Court invalidated congressional enactment of the Gun-Free
School Zones Act on the ground that Congress lacked the authority under the
Commerce Clause to encompass activity that had such an insubstantial connection
to interstate commerce." 5 In reaching that decision, the Court noted that, "to the
extent that congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative
judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce,
even though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye, they are
lacking here.""' 6 Properly drawn congressional findings can help support statutes
that otherwise would be invalidated on constitutional grounds." 7 The Supreme
Court therefore might defer substantially to explicit congressional findings
supporting an alternative way to remedy Fourth Amendment violations.
Conversely, Congress's failure to include findings may lessen, though not
completely eliminate, the deference accorded to its legislative product."'
114. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
115. Seeid. at567.
116. Id. at 563.
117. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995) (requiring Congress
to justify affirmative action legislation with specific findings because "classifications based on race are
potentially so harmful to the entire body politic, it is especially important that the reasons for any such
classification be clearly identified."); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154-57 (1971) (upholding
congressional power to regulate loan sharking).
118. In United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999), the Fourth Circuit upheld a
congressional determination that Miranda warnings were not essential to preserve the right against self-
incrimination in federal proceedings. Congress evidently sought to overrule Miranda without providing
any new ways to prevent constitutional violations. Despite the lack of findings as to why the prior
remedial scheme would be effective, the court in Dickerson held that the legislation displaced the
Miranda rule. See id. at 671.
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Thus, a legislative alternative would spur the United States Supreme Court to
consider whether the exclusionary rule is still needed. Based on the Bivens
analogy, the Court might well defer to any comprehensive legislative scheme, like
the one advocated in the Pepperdine Study, " 9 even if the remedy provides less
deterrence than the exclusionary rule. The presence of legislative findings might
prompt the Court to accept the legislative alternative more readily.
Nor would the administrative mechanism be the only relevant change in the
legal landscape to consider. First, as previously discussed, the Court in
Bivens-after Mapp-held that individuals could sue government officials directly
for constitutional injuries suffered. 20 Bivens arose out of an unreasonable search
and seizure. After Bivens, individuals can recover-contingent upon official
immunity doctrine-for injuries arising out of illegal searches and seizures.' 2'
Second, Congress, also after Mapp, waived the federal government's immunity
from such claims in a 1974 amendment to the Federal Tort Claims Act.'22
Congress evidently responded to publicity surrounding several notorious raids by
federal law enforcement personnel that included illegal searches. 23 In one
instance, Herbert and Evelyn Giglotto awoke in the evening to the sound of
someone breaking down the door of their home. 24 Five shabbily dressed men
entered and motioned with their pistols for Mr. Giglotto to return to his bedroom."2
They threw him face down on his bed, and tied his hands behind his back.'26 The
men finally identified themselves as federal officers and then forced Mrs. Giglotto,
clad only in a negligee, also to lie face down with hands shackled.'27 After a
fifteen-minute search, an officer entered the bedroom and exclaimed that they had
the wrong people. 2 ' The officers then left after untying the couple, leaving a
broken television, camera, and antique vase in their wake. 2 9 This story evidently
helped galvanize congressional attention to overzealousness on the part of some
federal law enforcement officials.
119. See Perrin et al., supra note 1, at 743-55.
120. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
121. See id; see also Lawmaster v. Ward, 125 F.3d 1341 (10th Cir. 1997); Ayeni v. Mottola, 35
F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994); Ginter v. Stallcup, 869 F.2d 384 (8th Cir. 1989); Tarpley v. Greene, 684 F.2d
I (D.C. Cir. 1982).
122. See 28 U.S.C. § 2671-80 (1994).
123. See Jack Boger et al., The Federal Tort Claim Act International Torts Amendment: An
Interpretive Analysis, 54 N.C. L. REV. 497, 498 (1976).







Consequently, in 1974 Congress authorized suit under the FTCA for Bivens
claims as well as some intentional torts based upon acts or omissions of law
enforcement officers.130 Both the government and law enforcement officers can
now be sued for abusive interrogation tactics.
Consider the Ninth Circuit's decision in Arevalo v. Woods. 13' There, plaintiff
was a passenger in a car believed to be transporting illegal aliens across Oregon.1
32
An INS official stopped the car because the plaintiff and his passenger looked to
be of Mexican descent. 3 3 Plaintiff, who spoke fluent English and was born in this
country, refused the officer's request to produce identification. 134  Without
inquiring as to plaintiff's citizenship, the official then handcuffed Arevalo and his
passenger and transported them to a location where another official was waiting.
35
After more threats and badgering, the officials finally released plaintiff.' 36 Plaintiff
successfully recovered under the FTCA for violation of the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures.
137
Moreover, victims of unconstitutional searches and seizures can recover under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 in more contexts than they could at the time of Mapp.'31
Although suit for wrongful searches could be maintained against state and local
officials at the time of Mapp, the Supreme Court had held that no redress was
possible against municipalities themselves. 39  Thereafter, in Monnell v.
Department of Social Services'4 the Court changed direction, holding that
municipalities fell within the purview of section 1983.' ' Consequently, victims
can now sue local governments as long as they can show some tie between the
locality's custom or policy and the injury. 42
Finally, although the data are hardly conclusive, some evidence exists that law
enforcement officials currently abuse suspects' rights far less than during the era
preceding Miranda.43 Studies attest to the greater training and internal monitoring
130. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1994).
131. 811 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1987).
132. See id. at 488.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 489.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id.; cf. Gasho v. Bell, 39 F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1994) (recognizing possible FTCA claim for
intentional infliction of emotional stress arising out of arrest by law enforcement officials). Criminal
penalties are currently theoretically available against such officials as well. See generally United States
v. Lanier, 117 S. Ct. 1219 (1997) (construing 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-42 to apply to constitutional injuries
inflicted by officers acting under color of law).
138. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
139. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 192 (1961).
140. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
141. See id. at 690-91.
142. See id.; see also Perrin et al., supra note 1, at 748.
143. See Perrin et al., supra note 1, at 674.
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in law enforcement agencies than previously existed,'" and the Supreme Court has
focused on that factor in determining whether to apply the exclusionary rule."5
Moreover, there may be greater social stigma placed on excessive searches than
there was prior to Mapp.
In sum, the Supreme Court may well defer to a comprehensive legislative
alternative such as the Pepperdine Study in deciding whether to jettison the
exclusionary rule.'" The Court would likely consider whether the combination of
possible civil suits against federal officers, constitutional and other tort actions
against the federal government, civil rights suits against local governments, and
greater internal control over law enforcement personnel has removed the imperative
for the prophylactic Mapp exclusionary rule. 47 The Court likely will pay heed to
any careful effort by the legislature to fashion a different approach.
li.
When confronted with a claim that legislative change has obviated the
necessity for the exclusionary rule, the Supreme Court should assess the adequacy
of the legislative alternative and consider any legislative findings in support. The
degree of deference is open to question, but the Bivens analogy suggests that the
Court will likely defer to any such legislative effort, as well it should if the
legislative alternative ensures sufficient deterrence.'" The issue remains, however,
whether state and federal courts may independently review the efficacy of
alternative mechanisms, such as the administrative scheme sketched in the
Pepperdine Study, to determine whether to eliminate the exclusionary rule. 49 Or,
144. In part, the improved training and increased monitoring may stem from imposition of the
exclusionary rule. See, e.g., JEROME H. SKOLNICK AND JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POUCE AND
THE ExCEssIVE USE OF FORCE, 18-20 (1993) (concluding that officers currently use less force than in
decades past); Neal A. Milner, Supreme Court Effectiveness and the Police Organization, 36 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 467 (1971); Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor:
An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75 (1992); Stephen H.
Sachs, The Exclusionary Rule: A Prosecutor's Defense, I CRIM. JUSTICE. ETHICS 28, 31 (1982); see
also Paul G. Cassell, The Mysterious Creation of Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rules Under State
Constitutions: The Utah Example, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 751,850-54; Perrin et al., supra note 1, at 674.
145. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1044-45 (1984) (stressing the safeguard of
potential INS disciplinary procedures faced by officers conducting excessive searches).
146. See Perrin, supra note 1, at 743-54.
147. In Dickerson, the Fourth Circuit ruled that federal legislation trumped Miranda without
inquiring whether the legislative remedy provided was constitutionally adequate. See supra note 118.
Surely, courts after Miranda and Mapp must independently consider the adequacy of alternative
remedies before jettisoning the court-fashioned rule.
148. See supra notes 51-64 and accompanying text.
149. See Perrin et al., supra note 1, at 743-54.
must the Supreme Court be the sole decision-maker?'50
There is much to be said for requiring lower courts to adhere to the Mapp
precedent until the Supreme Court decrees otherwise. Predictability is gained.
Defense counsel, prosecutors, and trial judges more readily will be able to gauge
the success of various suppression motions. Awaiting a Supreme Court decision
will also promote uniformity: the same means for enforcing the Fourth
Amendment will apply in all courts, whether federal or state. Moreover,
encouraging fidelity to precedent augments the Supreme Court's control over lower
courts. In the analogous context of the arguably prophylactic requirement of
Miranda warnings,'5' the Justice Department's current position is that only the
Supreme Court can reexamine the necessity for altering the Miranda warnings.'52
Indeed, the Supreme Court has directed lower federal courts to follow its own
precedents even when there is reason to believe that the Court might reexamine
them. In Agostini v. Felton'" the Court reconsidered whether the Establishment
Clause barred the New York City Board of Education from sending public school
teachers into parochial schools to provide remedial education to disadvantaged
children."5 4 In 1985 the Court held such practice unconstitutional, and on remand,
the district court issued a permanent injunction.' The Court presumably accepted
the case for review in light of the substantial changes in Establishment Clause
doctrine in the subsequent twelve years.'56 Nonetheless, the Court "reaffirm[ed]
that '[i]f a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to
rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals
should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative
of overruling its own decisions.""" Even though the Court's own Establishment
Clause analysis had changed, the Court reserved to itself the power to reexamine
the validity of its prior precedent.' 8 The Court's position fosters predictability and
helps ensure its own managerial control over lower courts.
However, the Mapp context is arguably quite different than that in Agostini.
Abandoning the exclusionary rule would not overrule Mapp. Mapp, after all,
150. For an analogous inquiry in the Miranda context, see Krent, supra note 23, at 1181-88.
151. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Supreme Court in Miranda, similar to its
reasoning in Mapp and its progeny, stated that "[olur decision in no way creates a constitutional
straitjacket which will handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have this effect. We
encourage Congress and the States to continue their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of
protecting the rights of the individual." See id. at 467.
152. SeeBrieffortheUnited States at 22-24, United States v.Leong, 116F.3d 1474 (4th Cir. 1997)
(No. 96-4876).
153. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
154. See id. at 237.
155. See Aguilarv. Felton, 473 U.S. 402,414 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203
(1997).
156. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 209.
157. Id. at 237 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,
484 (1989)) (alteration in original).
158. See id.
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anticipates the possibility of altering the exclusionary rule as conditions change and
alternative safeguards are adopted. The Court's repeated stress that the rule
constitutes "a judicially created means of deterring illegal searches and seizures" '59
seemingly invites legislative examination of alternative paths to deterrence. Once
legislatures have acted, should lower federal courts take the first crack at whether
changes in the legal and administrative landscape warrant reexamination of the
exclusionary rule?
Lower federal courts routinely assess the adequacy of different remedial
schemes in several contexts. For instance, as discussed earlier, lower courts
pursuant to Bivens determine the adequacy of existing legislative altematives."6
Courts assess the comprehensiveness of the alternatives and the suitability of
administrative fora for airing constitutional claims. The suggested role for lower
courts under Mapp, scrutinizing the availability and adequacy of alternative
remedial schemes, 6' is hardly novel.
The Supreme Court's call in Mapp for a study of alternative remedial schemes
should not preclude consideration by lower federal courts. Lower courts have the
duty to determine whether, in light of changes in the legal landscape, the
exclusionary rule is still required. If Congress passed a nationwide administrative
scheme-such as the one advocated in the Pepperdine Study 62-then federal district
courts should, in a properly drawn case or controversy, ascertain whether the
exclusionary rule should continue to be applied. Moreover, the Supreme Court
would benefit from obtaining the view of the lower courts on the adequacy of any
administrative remedial mechanism, just as it benefits from percolation of federal
law issues in other contexts. 63 The Supreme Court's power to decide which cases
to review presupposes the advantages of affording different circuit courts of appeal
the opportunity to consider the same legal issues. The Supreme Court retains the
ultimate authority to resolve any split in the circuits or even to review any appellate
decisions that seem out of line.
159. See Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 2019 (1998).
160. See supra notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
161. Indeed, the Supreme Court has long directed lower courts to preclude a remedy under one
federal statute if a more comprehensive remedial scheme exists. See Brown v. Gen. Serv. Admin., 425
U.S. 820 (1976) (holding that Title VII is exclusive judicial remedy for discrimination claims arising
out of federal employment); United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149 (1966) (declining to find FrCA
.remedy when more specific worker's compensation remedy existed); Norman v. Niagara Mohawk Power
Corp., 873 F.2d 634 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding RICO preempted by comprehensive administrative
remedial scheme).
162. See Perrin et al., supra note 1, at 743-54.
163. See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedent, 46 STAN.
L. REV. 817 (1994); Michael S. Paulsen, Accusing Justice: Some Variations on the Themes of Robert
M. Cover's Justice Accused, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 33, 82-83 (1990).
State courts as well should consider whether to uphold the exclusionary rule
in light of legal and institutional changes within their own states. The suggestion
that state courts can determine whether the exclusionary rule should be followed
within their jurisdictions may appear radical. Yet federalism concerns strongly
suggest that states be free to experiment with different controls on law enforcement
agencies. State courts fully comply with Mapp by considering legislation in their
own states that addresses the individual's right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. 64 Should California's legislature adopt the administrative
remedy advocated in the Pepperdine Study,' 65 California's courts should then
determine whether the exclusionary rule must still be followed in California's
courts. 1' State courts would abide by their duty to apply controlling federal law
in cases within their jurisdiction67 even if they determined that the exclusionary
rule was no longer needed to enforce the Fourth Amendment. And, decisions by
California's courts on federal law issues are ultimately superintended, through the
power of certiorari, by the United States Supreme Court. 68
Should the United States Supreme Court grant certiorari, the Court then would
need to make an independent judgment as to the adequacy of the state legislative
alternative to the exclusionary rule. Separation of powers concerns do not counsel
deference, and thus the Court is less likely to defer to state legislators than to
Congress. The analogy to congressional creation of alternatives to the judicially
fashioned Bivens remedy does not hold. 69 From Martin v. Hunter's Lessee70
onward, the Court has not trusted state legislative protection of federal rights as
much as that initiated by Congress. But federalism principles suggest that the
Court at least consider the state legislators' justification for the alternative and any
gloss imposed by the superintending state courts.' 7' The Court's power to review
ensures that the constitutional right not be whittled away by hostile state legislation
164. Indeed, it would be somewhat unrealistic to relegate all claims for eliminating or limiting the
exclusionary rule to the Supreme Court in the first instance. Such a practice would force litigants to
raise arguments in lower courts that they know had to be rejected by those courts. Perhaps, more
importantly, the Supreme Court would not be able to benefit from lower courts'views on the important
issues raised.
165. See Perrin et al., supra note 1, at 746.
166. Or, state courts might fashion the alternative remedy themselves. The Alaska Supreme Court
in Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985), imposed a duty to record electronically every
custodial interrogation, lessening the need for Miranda warnings to some extent.
167. See U.S. CONsT. art VI, § cl. 2 ("[The Laws of the United States... shall be the supreme Law
of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby.").
168. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1993) (providing for discretionary review by the Supreme Court over
all state court decisions involving federal law issues).
169. See supra text accompanying notes 54-65.
170. 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816) (asserting jurisdiction over state court denial of a claim that
state confiscation of land violated federal rights).
171. See Developments in the Law: The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 1324, 1367 (1982). Should a case involving local governmental officials be heard in federal court,
the federal court must determine whether the state courts would likely find that existence of the
legislative alternative obviates the need for the exclusionary rule.
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and state courts.
As a result, the exclusionary rule may not be honored in all fifty states. There
may be something discomfiting about the fact that the Fourth Amendment will be
enforced differently among the several states. But any lack of uniformity should
be accepted as the price we pay for our system of federalism. States should be
free-subject to monitoring by the United States Supreme Court-to determine the
best way to deter Fourth Amendment violations within their respective
jurisdictions.'
Indeed, the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is not
uniform today. State courts have interpreted the same language in their own
constitutions to afford more protection than that guaranteed under the Fourth
Amendment.' The United States Supreme Court in Cooper v. California7 4 stated
that federal standards do "not affect the state's power to impose higher standards
on searches and seizures than required by the Federal Constitution if it chooses to
do so.""' Accordingly, many states exclude evidence that would be admissible in
federal court.
For instance, in State v. Guzman'76 the Idaho Supreme Court considered
whether to follow the federal Supreme Court rule in United States v. Leon, '77 which
had declined to apply the exclusionary rule in contexts where a search based on less
than probable cause (and hence unconstitutional) had nonetheless been undertaken
in good faith. '78 Idaho parted company with the federal precedent because the court
found it "important that the protections accorded under our state constitution not
be diminished by a permanently pervading adoption of the federal good faith
exception."'7 The Idaho Supreme Court recognized a far greater role for the
exclusionary rule than did its federal counterpart: "[e]vidence illegally seized must
be suppressed because to admit it would constitute an independent constitutional
172. Currently, states have differed in whether to apply the exclusionary rule to violations of the
states'own requirements. Compare State v. Eubanks, 196 S.E.2d 706, 709 (N.C. 1973) (declining to
fashion exclusionary rule for violation of particular misdemeanor arrest warrant requirement) and
People v. Burdo, 223 N.W.2d 358, 360 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974) (same) with State v. Laflin, 627 A.2d
344, 346 (Vt. 1993) (requiring exclusion of evidence) and State v. Haigh, 315 A.2d 431, 433 (R.I.
1974) (same).
173. See generally Ken Gormley and Rhonda G. Hartman, Privacy and the States, 65 TEMP. L.
REV. 1279, 1299-1302 (1992) (discussing various state supreme court decisions affording greater
protections than those provided by the Fourth Amendment).
174. 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
175. Id. at 62.
176. 842 P.2d 660 (Idaho 1992).
177. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
178. See Guzman, 842 P.2d at 660-61; see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 913.
179. See Guzman, 842 P.2d at 667-68.
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violation by the court in addition to the violation at the time of the illegal search."'80
Many other state courts have departed from federal standards developed under the
Fourth Amendment as well. 8' There may be one Fourth Amendment, but there is
no uniform right to be free from unreasonable searches, 82 and states are free to
afford greater safeguards than mandated by a federal constitutional floor. 
83
Although states may not afford less protection than guaranteed under the
Fourth Amendment, they can reject the enforcement strategy in Mapp if, as I have
argued, the Supreme Court has overenforced the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. States may choose to safeguard the federal right in a
different manner than that pursued in the federal courts. While some state courts
may utilize the exclusionary rule more than their federal counterparts, others may
rely upon alternative schemes such as that proposed in the Pepperdine Study.'84
180. Seeid.at671.
181. For a representative sampling, see Chames v. DiGiacomo, 612 P.2d 1117 (Colo. 1980); State
v. Miller, 630 A.2d 1315 (Conn. 1993); State v. Kearns, 867 P.2d 903 (Haw. 1994); State v. Hempele,
576 A.2d 793 (N.J. 1990); People v. Class, 494 N.E.2d 444 (N.Y. 1986); Commonwealth v. DeJohn,
403 A.2d 1283 (Pa. 1979); State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D. 1976); State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d
460 (Utah 1990); State v. Boland, 800 P.2d 1112 (Wash. 1990).
182. Indeed, if state courts rest their decisions on both state and federal grounds, they immunize
themselves from Supreme Court review. Under the independent and adequate state grounds doctrine,
the Supreme Court will not review a state court decision, despite a possibly erroneous analysis of a
federal constitutional guarantee, if an independent state ground exists. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032, 1038 (1983).
183. Not all federal interests need be respected identically by the respective states. In Johnson v.
Fankell, 520 U.S. 911 (1997), a former liquor store clerk filed in state court a due process action under
§ 1983 against officials of the Idaho Liquor Dispensary who had terminated her employment. See id.
at 913. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of qualified immunity, which the state trial
court denied. See id. at 913-14. Defendants appealed the denial on the ground that the denial of a
qualified immunity claim is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine, as it is in federal
court. See id. at 914. Plaintiff argued that Idaho did not regard the denial of a qualified immunity claim
as immediately appealable, and instead prized more highly the plaintiffs right to vindicate his or her
interests without undue delay. See id. The Idaho Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiff, holding
that-despite the federal court precedent-Idaho did not permit officials sued for federal constitutional
violations to appeal the denial of any claim for immunity. See id. The United States Supreme Court
affirmed Idaho's decision to deny the appeal, explaining:
[T]he ultimate purpose of qualified immunity is to protect the State and its officials from over-
enforcement of federal rights. The Idaho Supreme Court's application of the State's
procedural rules in this context is thus less an interference with federal interests than a
judgment about how best to balance the competing state interests of limiting interlocutory
appeals and providing state officials with immediate review of the merits of their defense.
Id. at 919-20. Our system of federalism embraces the possibility that the level of protection afforded
federal interests will vary among the several states.
184. See Perrin et al., supra note 1, at 743-54.
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CONCLUSION
We are accustomed to uniform constitutional rights. The federal plan of
convention seemingly ensures all citizens the same rights in the several states.
But when the Supreme Court overenforces a constitutional right, it leaves room
for both Congress and state legislatures to create alternative means to effectuate
that same constitutional interest. Reasons for over-enforcement vary, but stem
from the Court's view that alternative safeguards for the constitutional right are
wanting. The Court may believe that, in the absence of overenforcement, there may
be little way to guarantee respect for the underlying constitutional norm.
Such is the story with Mapp. In the absence of the exclusionary rule, the Court
determined that the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures would
be neglected, if not nullified.'85 State immunity doctrines would frustrate all but
the most compelling trespass and assault charges.
But times change, and the Court in Mapp recognized that the exclusionary rule
might not always be required. 86  Alterations in the legal landscape have
undermined at least some of the initial impetus for the exclusionary rule. 87 More
efficacious tort remedies exist, internal monitoring of law enforcement agencies is
more prevalent, and more dynamic proposals-as in the Pepperdine Study-have
been raised to rein in law enforcement agencies while still promising redress for
unconstitutional conduct.
In short, state and lower federal courts, if confronted by a state's decision to
rely on alternatives to the exclusionary rule, should make an independent inquiry
into the adequacy of the alternative posed. In so doing, they should defer to
legislative factfinding buttressing the reforms, but scrutinize the new mechanism
to ensure the vitality of the right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures."' The United States Supreme Court would superintend all such
determinations, balancing the need to enforce the Fourth Amendment with the right
of Congress and state legislatures to effect deterrence and compensation in
innovative ways. The right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures may
be protected without exacting the all-too-often problematic costs of the
exclusionary rule.
185. See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
186. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,650-60 (1991).
187. See supra notes 27-46 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 146-83 and accompanying text.
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